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CONSENT TO FILING OF AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
 
 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), all parties to this appeal have 
consented to the filing of this amicus curiae brief. 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
Amici are constitutional law professors who have special interest in 
religious freedom and civil rights. Professor Leslie C. Griffin is the William S. 
Boyd Professor of constitutional law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 
Boyd School of Law. Erwin Chemerinsky is the founding Dean and 
Distinguished Professor of Law, and Raymond Pryke Professor of First 
Amendment Law, at the University of California, Irvine School of Law, with a 
joint appointment in Political Science. David R. Dow is the Cullen Professor at 
the University of Houston Law Center, the Rorschach Visiting Professor of 
History at Rice University, and the Founder of the Texas Innocence Network. 
Sheldon H. Nahmod is a Distinguished Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute 
of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law.  
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or 
party’s counsel contributed to funding the preparation or the submission of this 
brief. Amici are solely responsible for this brief.  
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 
This lawsuit arose from a successful Establishment Clause claim 
against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) in Scott v. Pierce, 
et al., Civil Action No. H-09-3391 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2012). In Scott, the 
district court ruled that the State could not deny Jehovah’s Witness William 
Scott the opportunity to meet with his coreligionists without a volunteer 
present while allowing Muslim prisoners to do so. In direct response to that 
ruling, and “solely” because of it, TDCJ cancelled the Muslims’ right to 
meet for religious worship without a volunteer present. Brown v. Livingston, 
17 F.Supp.3d 616, 628 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Instead of curing the original 
Establishment Clause violation, as TDCJ contends, that action violated the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment as well as 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Accordingly, amici urge this court to affirm the district 
court’s ruling in Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616 (S.D. Tex. 2014), 
which correctly found Establishment, Free Exercise, and RLUIPA violations 
in the State’s policy of restricting Muslim prisoners’ religious worship.  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
TDCJ violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
when it gave preferential worship opportunities to Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish, and Native American prisoners over Muslim inmates, thereby 
inhibiting the Appellees’ practice of religion. The Establishment Clause 
requires “the principle of denominational neutrality,” Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228, 246 (1982), and prohibits the government from taking actions 
whose “principal or primary effect . . . inhibits religion.” Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). TDCJ contravened both Establishment 
Clause standards in this case.  
TDCJ’s actions restricting the Muslim prisoners’ worship similarly 
infringed upon the fundamental principle of the Free Exercise Clause that 
“government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice.” 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 
(1993). Because Appellees were “denied a reasonable opportunity of 
pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow 
prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts,” a free exercise 
violation occurred. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).  
TDCJ’s policy preventing Muslim prisoners from practicing rituals 
central to their faith also violated RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, by 
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substantially burdening Appellees’ religion without using the least restrictive 
means to further a compelling government interest. As this Court lately 
explained, “[r]ecent Supreme Court cases . . . have reaffirmed that the 
burden on the government in demonstrating the least restrictive means test is 
a heavy burden.” McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 
475-76 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ––– U.S. 
–––, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014) and McCullen v. 
Coakley, ––– U.S. –––, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540, 189 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2014)). 
Appellants’ volunteer policy does not meet that heavy burden. Therefore the 
district court’s ruling should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
 
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment 
apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940). Congress instructed prison officials to accommodate prisoners’ 
religious freedom in RLUIPA. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14,465 (daily ed. Oct. 
27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[E]xposure to religion is the best hope 
we have for rehabilitation of a prisoner. Most prisoners, like it or not, will 
eventually be returning to our communities. I want to see a prisoner exposed 
to religion while in prison. We should accommodate efforts to bring religion 
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to prisoners.”); id. at S14,466 (statement of Sen. Dole) (“[I]f religion can 
help just a handful of prison inmates get back on track, then the 
inconvenience of accommodating their religious beliefs is a very small price 
to pay.”). TDCJ’s proposed policy requiring Muslim prisoners to meet only 
with a volunteer present, thereby limiting their exercise of religion, violates 
the two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and RLUIPA.  
I. TDCJ violated the Establishment Clause by cancelling the 
Muslims’ right to worship without a volunteer present. 
 
The Establishment Clause requires the “principle of denominational 
neutrality.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). It also prohibits the 
government from taking actions whose “principal or primary effect . . .  
inhibits religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). TDCJ’s 
policy on Muslim worship violates both Larson’s and Lemon’s 
Establishment Clause standards.  
A. TDCJ’s policy prefers non-Muslim Protestants, Catholics, 
Jews, and Native Americans to Muslims in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  
 
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one 
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson 
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (No State may “pass laws which aid one 
religion” or that “prefer one religion over another”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
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U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“[t]he government must be neutral when it comes to 
competition between sects.”); School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (“[t]he fullest realization of true 
religious liberty requires that government . . . effect no favoritism among 
sects . . . and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.”). The Supreme 
Court has stated that the prohibition against preferential treatment of religion 
is “absolute.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.  
The rule of Larson applies when a law or policy discriminates among 
religions, as TDCJ’s policy does in this case. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 
(10th Cir. 2012). Larson requires strict scrutiny. Once the government has 
set a policy of denominational preference, “that rule must be invalidated 
unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest, [citations 
omitted] and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest.” Larson, 456 
U.S. at 247. Even in the prison setting, the “overwhelming majority” of 
courts that have heard prisoners’ Establishment Clause challenges have 
applied strict scrutiny instead of deference toward prison administrators. See 
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 187–88 (Tex. 2001); id. at 188, n. 11 
(collecting cases applying and not applying the deferential Turner standard 
to Establishment Clause cases); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. United States, No. 
3:14-CV-00565-HA, 2014 WL 5500495, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2014) 
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(identifying district courts that have applied strict scrutiny to prisoners’ 
Larson claims).  
During the 1970s, discrimination against Muslims in the Texas prison 
system led the State to enter into the consent decree that the State seeks to 
vacate in this case. Brown v. Beto, 4:74-CV-0069 (S.D. Tex. 1977). That 
consent decree ensured that Muslims received equal treatment with other 
non-Muslim prisoners, specifically “equal time for worship services and 
other religious activities each week as is enjoyed by adherents to the 
Catholic, Jewish and Protestant faiths.” Id. Pursuant to that decree, “Muslim, 
Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Native American inmates have all enjoyed 
an average of six hours of religious activities each week.” Brown v. 
Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 621 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Under TDCJ’s new 
policy, however, Muslims receive only one hour per week of religious 
programming while the other groups retain their six hours. Id. at 622. The 
Establishment Clause prohibits such preference of the Jewish, Catholic, 
Protestant, and Native American faiths to Islam.  
Jewish and Native American prisoners are similarly preferred to 
Muslims in violation of the Establishment Clause because TDCJ grants them 
special accommodations unavailable to Muslims. “Jewish inmates are 
assigned to four particular units within the prison system specifically to 
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bring them closer to Jewish religious volunteers and [] Native American 
inmates are assigned to housing units specifically selected to make religious 
activities more available to them, while TDCJ makes no effort to house 
Muslim inmates in units close to the population centers where Muslim 
volunteers might be recruited.” Id. at 631. Thus TDCJ has disobeyed the 
“clearest command of the Establishment Clause” by officially preferring 
several religious denominations to Islam. Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.  
Larson requires that TDCJ’s policy “must be invalidated unless it is 
justified by a compelling government interest, [citations omitted] and unless 
it is closely fitted to further that interest.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 247. The 
State’s usual compelling interests in safety and security in the prison setting 
are not relevant to the Larson analysis in this case. First, TDCJ enacted this 
policy “solely” in response to Scott v. Pierce and not for any safety- or 
security-related reasons. Brown, 17 F.Supp.3d at 628. Second, the district 
court found there were no safety or security violations during the 35 years 
that Muslims met without a volunteer present under the Brown v. Beto 
consent decree. Id. Third, “the purpose of outside volunteers is to improve 
the quality of the services, not provide security.” Id. at 627. Thus the district 
court concluded that allowing Muslims to meet without a volunteer present 
had “no adverse impact on prison safety or the administration of criminal 
      Case: 14-20249      Document: 00512897060     Page: 14     Date Filed: 01/12/2015
 9 
justice. On the other hand, there are security concerns relating to increased 
reliance on and use of volunteers.” Id. at 628.  
TDCJ’s policy is not closely fitted to a compelling government 
interest. TDCJ’s policy cannot survive Larson’s exacting scrutiny; it violates 
the Establishment Clause. 
B. TDCJ’s policy inhibits Muslim religious exercise in violation of 
the Establishment Clause.  
 
The Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from taking 
actions whose “principal or primary effect . . . advances [or] inhibits 
religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Although most of 
the case law interpreting Lemon involves government efforts to advance 
religion, government action whose “principal or primary effect . . . inhibits 
religion” also violates the Establishment Clause, as TDCJ’s policy does 
here. Id.; see also Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“it is far more typical for an Establishment Clause case to challenge 
instances in which the government has done something that favors religion 
or a particular religious group”). Although the government may not inhibit, 
disadvantage, or disapprove of religious practice, “there is ample room for 
accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause.” Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 
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(2005) (“This Court has long recognized that the government may . . . 
accommodate religious practices . . . without violating the Establishment 
Clause.”). Allowing the Muslims to meet without a volunteer present 
properly accommodated their religious freedom for 35 years. In contrast, 
denying them the opportunity to meet for religious worship inhibits their 
religious freedom in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
TDCJ’s policy disadvantages and inhibits Muslim religious practice 
rather than accommodating it. Muslim inmates in Texas enjoyed equal 
access to religious worship for 35 years pursuant to the consent decree in 
Brown v. Beto. That policy allowed Muslims ample opportunity to 
participate in three religious practices—Jum’ah, Taleem, and Qur’anic 
studies—that are required by Islam. Instead of understanding how the 
consent decree accommodated religious freedom for 35 years, TDCJ’s new 
policy replaced one Establishment Clause violation with another in response 
to Scott v. Pierce. The new policy restricted Muslim worship from six hours 
to one hour per week and failed to offer Muslims accommodations 
previously made for Jews and Native Americans. Because of the new policy, 
“Muslim inmates have not had access to Taleem or Qur’anic Studies, except 
when they are housed in units that are the home station of one of the five 
Muslim Chaplains. Even in those instances, access to all necessary religious 
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programs is not guaranteed.” Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 626 
(S.D. Tex. 2014). The Muslim prisoners’ religion was inhibited by TDCJ’s 
new policy. 
“When government action violates the Lemon test by inhibiting 
religion, the Court’s doctrine obviously works to protect religion from 
disadvantage.” Daniel O. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of the 
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1113, 1180 (1988). The district 
court’s decision invalidating TDCJ’s policy protects the Muslim religion 
from disadvantage; it should be affirmed here. 
II. TDCJ’s policy violates the Free Exercise Clause by singling out 
Muslims for unfavorable treatment in a non-neutral manner. 
 
Prisoners retain their constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–50 (1987). This 
Court reviews prison regulations that impinge on free exercise under the 
deferential standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) and upholds 
regulations that are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 
Freeman v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 860-61 (5th Cir. 
2004).  
The first part of Turner’s four-factor test, namely “whether there is a 
rational relationship between the regulation and the legitimate government 
interest advanced,” is the most important factor for this Court to consider. 
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See Scott v. Miss. Dept. of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1992) (a court 
need not “weigh evenly, or even consider, each of these factors,” as 
rationality is the controlling standard); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564-
65 (5th Cir. 2004) (“In Freeman, we held that the TDCJ's religious 
accommodation policy is rationally related to legitimate government 
objectives, the first and ‘paramount inquiry under Turner.’”). To survive 
Turner’s rationality scrutiny, the government’s policy must be neutral; a 
“court ‘must determine whether the government objective underlying the 
regulation at issue is legitimate and neutral, and that the regulations are 
rationally related to that objective.’” Freeman, 369 F.3d at 861 (quoting 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414-15 (1989)); see also Mayfield v. 
Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 607 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(“Turner’s standard also includes a neutrality requirement.”). 
TDCJ’s policy prohibiting Muslim inmates from meeting for religious 
worship without a volunteer present is not neutral. Therefore its 
impingement of prisoner free exercise rights is unconstitutional even under 
the deferential Turner standard of review.  
As explained in Part I, TDCJ’s policy is non-neutral between Muslims 
and members of other religious denominations, including Protestants, 
Catholics, Jews, and Native Americans who receive not only more hours of 
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religious worship but also better housing accommodations to gain access to 
volunteers. Because the Muslim inmates were “denied a reasonable 
opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded 
fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts, then there 
was palpable discrimination by the State,” and a free exercise violation 
occurred. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 
Moreover, TDCJ’s policy is also non-neutral between Muslim 
prisoners who desire to exercise religion and other inmates who participate 
in secular activities. TDCJ allows prisoners to engage in secular activities 
without direct supervision while refusing the same privilege to Muslims. 
Numerous inmates meet to play dominoes, to practice foreign languages, to 
lead Safe Prison Program classes, to sing for the choir, to practice for the 
band, and to work with saws and propane torches in craft shop, all without 
direct supervision or a volunteer present. Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 
616, 628 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Yet Muslims may not meet to practice their 
religion under similar standards. “At a minimum, the protections of the Free 
Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all 
religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken 
for religious reasons.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532-34 (1993). TDCJ’s policy both discriminates 
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against Muslim religious belief and prohibits conduct undertaken for 
religious reasons. The protections of the Free Exercise Clause apply here 
and require affirmance of the decision of the district court.  
 
III. TDCJ’s policy violates RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burden 
on Muslims’ religious freedom without using the least restrictive 
means to further a compelling government interest. 
 
According to RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial 
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to [a jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility] unless the government demonstrates 
that imposition of the burden on that person--(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 
TDCJ’s policy violates RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burden on 
Muslim inmates’ religious freedom without using the least restrictive means 
to further a compelling government interest. 
Appellees easily meet their burden of establishing a RLUIPA claim 
because the 1) religious exercise of their 2) sincerely-held beliefs was 3) 
substantially burdened by the government’s action. See Moussazadeh v. 
Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 790 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The 
threshold questions for applying RLUIPA are whether a ‘religious exercise’ 
is at issue and whether the state action places a ‘substantial burden’ on that 
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exercise. Subsumed within the substantial-burden inquiry is the question 
whether the inmate sincerely believes in the requested religious exercises.”). 
First, RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” broadly to include “‘any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.’” Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2007). 
Appellees were restricted in their ability to practice Jum’ah, Taleem, and 
Qur’anic studies, rituals that are “indispensable to a Muslim’s exercise of his 
religious beliefs.” Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 625 (S.D. Tex. 
2014) (emphasis added). Appellees’ complaint satisfies even the stricter, 
pre-RLUIPA definition that the litigated religious exercise must be “central 
to a system of religious belief.” Longoria, 507 F.3d at 903 (5th Cir. 2007). 
Thus their claim easily satisfies the “religious exercise” element of RLUIPA.  
Second, many Appellees have practiced Islam in prison for more than 
10 years; the district court concluded that their sincerity is “undisputed” in 
this case. Brown, 17 F.Supp.3d at 625. Thus Appellees have crossed the 
sincerity threshold because “the plaintiff’s ‘sincerity’ in espousing that 
practice is largely a matter of individual credibility” and is “rarely 
challenged” in court. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 
2013); see also Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 
781, 792 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Though the sincerity inquiry is important, it must 
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be handled with a light touch, or ‘judicial shyness.’ We limit ourselves to 
‘almost exclusively a credibility assessment’ when determining sincerity. To 
examine religious convictions any more deeply would stray into the realm of 
religious inquiry, an area into which we are forbidden to tread.”). 
Third, this Court has employed a “fact-specific, case-by-case review” 
to determine whether TDCJ’s volunteer policy substantially burdens a 
plaintiff’s religion and has required the policy to be uniformly and neutrally 
applied. McAlister v. Livingston, 348 Fed.Appx. 923, 936-37 (5th Cir. 
2009); see also Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 613-14 (discussing previous Fifth 
Circuit cases examining TDCJ’s volunteer policy under RLUIPA and First 
Amendment); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723-24 (2005) (Like the 
Establishment Clause, RLUIPA does not allow the state to “differentiate 
among bona fide faiths” or “single out a particular sect for special 
treatment.”). As argued above in Parts I and II, TDCJ’s policy is not neutral 
between Muslims and Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Native Americans and 
inmates who meet for secular reasons. Thus under this Court’s precedents, 
the Appellees’ religion is substantially burdened by the policy’s lack of 
neutrality.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently warned that in assessing 
whether a plaintiff’s religion is substantially burdened, “it is not for us to say 
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that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our ‘narrow 
function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects 
an honest conviction.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2779 (2014) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)). Here, as in Hobby Lobby, “there is no dispute” 
that Appellees share an honest conviction that the loss of “indispensable” 
religious rituals (Jum’ah, Taleem, and Qur’anic studies) has substantially 
burdened their religion. Id.  
Because Appellees have established that their religion was 
substantially burdened by the government’s regulatory scheme, “the burden 
is on the government to establish that the regulation (1) advances a 
compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest.” McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 
F.3d 465, 472 (5th Cir. 2014). TDCJ cannot satisfy either prong of 
RLUIPA’s test. 
RLUIPA, like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb, requires “the Government to demonstrate that the 
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 
‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is 
being substantially burdened.” Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, 592-93 (5th 
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Cir. 2009) (quoting Gonzales v. O Central Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006)); see also McAllen Grace Brethren 
Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 2014) (the governmental 
interest cannot be “couched in very broad terms” but must be “focused” on 
the particular claimant whose interest is substantially burdened); Tagore v. 
United States, 735 F.3d 324, 330-31 (5th Cir. 2013) (“RFRA requires the 
government to explain how applying the statutory burden ‘to the person’ 
whose sincere exercise of religion is being seriously impaired furthers the 
compelling governmental interest.”).  
In this case, the government’s usual compelling interest in prison 
safety and security is not focused on these particular claimants. TDCJ 
enacted this policy “solely” in response to Scott v. Pierce and not for any 
safety- or security-related reasons. Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 
628 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Moreover, there were no reported safety or security 
violations during the 35 years that Muslims met without a volunteer present 
under the Brown v. Beto consent decree while, during the same period, some 
security incidents occurred while guards or volunteers were directly 
supervising other religious groups. Id. at 621. Indeed, the presence of 
volunteers may increase security risks. “Chaplain Pierce testified that the 
purpose of outside volunteers is to improve the quality of the services, not 
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provide security. Therefore, TDCJ administrator’s contention that the 
presence of an outside volunteer furthers its compelling state interest in 
prison security is unfounded and contradicted by the evidence.” Id. at 627. 
Because TDCJ offered no “specific evidence that [the particular Muslim 
claimants’] religious practices jeopardize its stated interests,” it does not 
have a compelling interest that satisfies RLUIPA. Merced v. Kasson, 577 
F.3d 578, 587-88, 592 (5th Cir. 2009).  
The Supreme Court has recently explained that cost is not a 
compelling interest that justifies the government’s decision to restrict 
religious freedom:  
both RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, may in some 
circumstances require the Government to expend additional 
funds to accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs. Cf. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc–3(c) (RLUIPA: “[T]his chapter may require a 
government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid 
imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.”). HHS’s 
view that RFRA can never require the Government to spend 
even a small amount reflects a judgment about the importance 
of religious liberty that was not shared by the Congress that 
enacted that law. 
 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 (2014). TDCJ 
may be required to incur expenses in support of the important value of 
prisoners’ religious freedom. 
Even if this Court assumes that prison administrators have a 
compelling interest in safety and security, TDCJ did not employ the least 
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restrictive means of attaining that interest. This Court has recently 
recognized that “least restrictive means” is an “exceptionally demanding” 
test that places a “heavy burden” on the government. McAllen Grace 
Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2014); see also 
Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“[t]he phrase ‘least restrictive means’ has its plain meaning.”). “The very 
existence of a government-sanctioned exception to a regulatory scheme that 
is purported to be the least restrictive means can, in fact, demonstrate that 
other, less-restrictive alternatives could exist.” McAllen, 764 F.3d at 475-76.  
Numerous government-sanctioned alternatives that are less restrictive 
of religious freedom are available in this case. TDCJ could pursue the 
consent-decree strategy that successfully allowed Muslim prisoners to meet 
without a volunteer present for 35 years. See Newby v. Quarterman, 325 
Fed.Appx. 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) (The “fact that Muslims regularly 
engage in communal worship without an approved religious volunteer is 
some evidence that the security and safety concerns identified by Texas can 
be addressed through less restrictive alternatives.”). The less restrictive, 
indirect supervision that worked for those 35 years continues to be employed 
in other settings in Texas prisons today. Such indirect supervision includes 
closed-circuit observation, audio and video recordings of prisoners’ 
      Case: 14-20249      Document: 00512897060     Page: 26     Date Filed: 01/12/2015
 21 
meetings, and roving patrols of security guards who look through windows 
at prisoners’ meetings. See Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616, 621 
(S.D. Tex. 2014); see also Inzunza v. Moore, No. 2:09-CV-0048, 2011 WL 
1211434, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (identifying possible alternatives 
that Muslim groups are “under visual and audio supervision at all times and 
the services are audio taped”); McKennie v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 
No. A-09-CV-906-LY, 2012 WL 443948, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2012) 
(considering testimony that volunteer groups could be policed by roving 
officers, listening devices, or video monitors). Those indirect supervisory 
practices have worked effectively for many years not only in Texas, but also 
in other jurisdictions like Florida and New York. Brown, 17 F.Supp.3d at 
627. “Chaplain Shabazz testified that many prison systems throughout the 
United States have adopted the Brown v. Beto regime, employing indirect 
supervision of inmate-led religious activities thereby permitting Muslim 
inmates full participation in religious activities.” Id. Because these less 
restrictive means permit full Muslim participation in religious activities, 
RLUIPA does not permit TDCJ to enact the more restrictive volunteers-
present policy.  
In sum, TDCJ “has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving 
its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of 
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religion by the objecting parties in these cases.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). Therefore, its policy violates 
RLUIPA and should not be imposed on Appellees. 
CONCLUSION 
 
TDCJ violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
when it gave preferential worship opportunities to Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish, and Native American prisoners over Muslim inmates, thereby 
inhibiting the Appellees’ practice of religion. TDCJ’s actions restricting the 
Muslim prisoners’ worship similarly infringed upon the fundamental 
principle of the Free Exercise Clause that government not suppress religious 
practice in a discriminatory manner. TDCJ’s policy preventing Muslim 
prisoners from practicing rituals central to their faith also violated RLUIPA, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, by substantially burdening Appellees’ religion 
without using the least restrictive means to further a compelling government  
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interest. Therefore amici respectfully request this Court to affirm the ruling 
of the district court.  
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